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THE EFFECT OF INCOME TAX PROGRESSIVITY
ON VALUATIONS OF INCOME STREAMS BY INDIVIDUALS
The effect of taxes upon Investment patterns in agriculture is an
important policy consideration which has received attention in past issues
of this journal. However, some authors have inadequately adjusted income-
stream valuation formulas for the effect of the individual income tax and
have consequently reached incorrect conclusions regarding both the present
value of future income and the effect of income tax progressivity on the
relative valuations of individuals in different tax brackets. Rodewald
(1969, 1971) and Devino considered the effect of taxes and financing upon
investment decisions, but their incomplete treatment of income taxes
produces a valuation formula which will result in incorrect investment
decisions* A more recent paper by Harris and Nehring considered the
impact of farm size on the bidding potential for agricultural land. Like
Rodewald and Devino, they adjusted the income stream for taxes, but did
not incorporate individual income tax rates in the discount rate used for
computing present values. Consequently they concluded that the pro
gressivity of individual income tax rates puts high-tax-bracket individ
uals at a competitive disadvantage in bidding for the perpetual income
stream produced by agricultural land.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the effect of income tax
rates upon the present value of income streams subject to normal income
taxes and to describe how income tax effects may be incorporated into
general valuation formulas. The next section discusses the relation
between present value analysis and bid price models and notes some
practical limitations of the latter. Subsequent sections describe how
risk can be correctly incorporated in present value calculations, how
normal income taxes affect present values, and how the availability of
tax-exempt municipal bond interest affects the present value of taxable
income streams and limits the optimum level of taxable investment income.
The conclusions are summarized in the final section.
Investment Decision Models
Two different investment decision models are contained in the
papers mentioned above. The simpler of the two is that used by Rodewald;
In it one computes the present value of the after-tax income stream
provided by an asset and purchases it only if that present value is
greater than or equal to the cost of the asset.
The bid price model used by Harris and Nehring provides a con
siderably broader framework for investment decisions. They also compute
a present value (using a risk-free discount rate), but the investment
decision is not made solely on the basis of that present value. An
investor's bid price also depends on: the risk associated with the
considered income stream, the investor's preferences regarding risk, the
riskiness of the investor's existing portfolio, and the covariance
between the return on presently held assets and the return provided by
the considered asset. Bid prices equal present values only if the
investor is risk neutral or if acquisition of the asset will not change
the riskiness of his portfolio holdings. Thus» bid prices are concep
tually more general and complete than are decision rules based solely
on present value. Whether the bid price model provides a useful
improvement depends critically on the availability and reliability of
the additional information required to compute bid prices. That
information includes detailed characteristics of investors' utility
functions, in addition to estimates of the risks and covariance
t
mentioned above.
Many Investors lack at least some of the information needed
for bid price calculations and consequently focus on present values in
making Investment decisions. The following section presents a method
for incorporating risk into present value calculations without recourse
to the information about utility functions required for bid price
models. Since Harris and Nehring's bid price model includes a present
value computation, the points made here regarding taxes and present
values apply to both decision models. Any tax effects upon present
values also apply to bid prices, although the converse is not always
true. Since bid price models incorporate utility functions, taxes
may have wealth effects on bid prices which do not appear in present
value formulas.
Present Value of Uncertain Income Streams
An Important characteristic of many income streams is that they
are highly variable over time. This feature is Incorporated into bid
price models, but Rodewald did not explicitly consider it in his present
value approach to Investment decisions. Hlrshleifer (1970, p. 262)
discusses two possible methods of accounting for the riskiness of income
streams in computing present values. One method (a) is to reduce the
distribution of possible returns in each future period to a certainty-
1equivalent value, then discount that series of terms with a rlskless
discount rate to obtain the "present certainty-equivalent value". The
certainty-equivalent value, like bid prices, depends on the investor's
utility function. The alternate method (b) is to compute the mathematical
expectation of the return in each future period, then discount this series
with the discount rate appropriate to the "risk-class" of the investment.^
Hlrshlelfer notes that although both approaches "lead In principle to the
same correct result, the information gaps that are the source of the
difficulty require in practice the employment of method (b) above",
(p. 262)
In its simplest form, the recommended procedure requires only
two pieces of Information. One is an estimate of the expected value
of the net Income produced by the asset in each future year, tt ; the
1
other is the prevailing rate of return, r°, on other assets in the
same risk class. The principle underlying estimation of tt^ is that it
is returns to Invested capital. Therefore, one subtracts from each
year's expected receipts all costs of inputs other than capital.
Property taxes are subtracted because other assets not subject to the
2property tax are available. Debt Interest should not be subtracted
because It is part of the return to capital Invested in the asset.
The choice of the appropriate risky discount rate is guided by
the principle that it should indicate the rate of return available on
assets containing the same degree of risk as the considered Investment.
Since the variance of net income from farmland depends on such factors
as the chosen cropping pattern and the amount of insurance purchased,
the appropriate risky discount rate may vary among investors planning
different uses of the land. The appropriate rate may be difficult to
estimate precisely, but as Hirschleifer (1961, p. 118) has noted, the
risky discount rate "is at least more of an observable magnitude than
the abstract riskless rate of interest". Since the general level of
prices is unstable, riskfree investments would exist only if some
assets were both free of default risk and were effectively indexed
against purchasing power risk. Currently, the riskless interest rate
cannot be observed, but a wide range of risky rates are visible.
Income Taxes and Present Values
The above procedure recommende4 by Hirshleifer abstracts completely
from income taxes; the expected income stream and the discount rate he
discusses are both in gross-of-tax terms. This section shows that taxes
may be safely ignored only when valuing' an income stream which is both
perpetual and is subject to only normal income taxes. If the income
stream is finite in time or'if special-income tax features such as
accelerated depreciation, capital gains, tax credits, etc., apply to it,
I
then the individual's tax rate does affect present values and must be
applied to both the income stream and the discount rate.
1 •
As Modigliani and Miller (1963) noted in their analysis of the
effect of corporate income taxes upon costs of capital and valuation
formulas, there are two equally good methods for valuing perpetual
income streams subject only to normal taxes. One can either discount
gross-of-'tax returns with the gross-of-tax cost of capital or one can
discount net-of-tax income with the net-of-tax cost of capital. Their
footnote 16, pp. 441-442 (1963) states:
"Although the before-tax and the net-of-tax' approaches
to the cost of capital provide equally good criteria for
investment decisions when assets are assumed to generate
perpetual (i.e., non-depreclatlng) streams, such is not the
case when assets are assumed to have finite lives. ... In
the latter event, the correct method for determining the
desirability of an investment would be, in principle, to
discount the net-of-tax stream at the net-of-tax cost
of capital. Only under this net-of-tax approach would
it be possible to take into account the deductibility
of depreciation. .
The expressions for the after-tax costs of capital developed by
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) for corporations are not applicable
to individual proprietors because individuals are not subject to the
corporate income tax. The appropriate discount rate for individual
(unincorporated) investors to use in computing present values is the
rate of return available on other assets in the same risk class; this
is the opportunity cost of alternate uses of invested funds, regardless
of whether the source of those funds is equity, debt, or any combination
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of the two. Therefore, the gross-of-tax cost of capital invested by
an individual is simply, r°, the prevailing rate-of-return in the asset's
risk class, and the net-of-tax cost of capital is r°(l-t), where t is
the investor's marginal income tax rate. The net-of-tax expression
recognizes that foregone returns would be subject to taxation (unless
it is municipal Interest discussed below)•
The siirq)le formula for the present value of a perpetuity illus
trates Modigllani and Miller's point about the equivalence of the
gross-of-tax and net-of-tax approaches. The present value, V, of
the net-of-tax perpetual income stream, TT(l-t), discounted with the
net-of-tax cost of capital, r°(l-t), is identical to the present
value of the gross-of-tax perpetual stream tt, discounted at the
gross-of-tax cost of capital,. r°.
a) =
r (1-t) r
This also demonstrates that the present value of a perpetual stream
does not depend on the tax bracket of the individual.^
The problem with Harris and Nehring, Rodewald, and Devino's
present value formulas is that Harris and Nehring explicity, and
Rodewald and Devino apparently, used a gross-of-tax interest rate to
discount net-of-tax income streams. Harris and Nehring note that
their present value formula [equation 6, p. 162] implies that indi
vidual valuations will decrease as the marginal income tax rate rises
and high income persons will ceteris paribus bid less for farmland
than will persons in lower tax brackets (p. 163). Since neither
Devino nor Rodewald mentioned any adjustment of the discount rate for
income, tax rates, they presumably would also use a gross-of-tax rate
in discounting. If so, Harris and Nehring's conclusion is also implied
by Rodewald's and Devino*s anaylses, although none of the above authors
has mentioned this.
Although income taxes may be safely ignored in valuing perpetuaties
subject only to normal income taxes, this is not true In general. If
the Income stream Is subject to only normal taxes and If It terminates
after n periods, Its present value Is:
(2) V* = ?




the present value of the Income stream will be less to high tax bracket
Individuals, than to those with lower marginal tax rates. Samuelsbn has
previously demonstrated this relation and has also shown that the effect
may be offset by the effect of the deductions for depreciation which
commonly apply to assets with finite lives. Samuelson showed that the
net effect of the tax rate vanishes only when tax deductible depreciation
exactly equals true economic depreciation.
If the considered income stream qualifies for any special tax con
siderations, such as accelerated depreciation deductions or the investment
tax credit, then (as Modigllani and Miller argued) the net-of-tax approach
is required. In this case, one needs to adjust the expected income stream
for the tax factors considered by Rodewald and by Devino, but two correc
tions to Rodewald's method are required. One, recognized by Devino (p. 135),
is that those finance charges which represent interest on debt should not
be subtracted, because the discount rate accounts for the required return
on all capital invested. Second, the discount rate must be adjusted for
the individual's marginal tax rate to obtain the net-of-tax opportunity
cost of capital' he invests. The present value of finite Income streams
which qualify for special tax treatment generally does depend on the
individual's tax rate. Normally taxed perpetuities (such as indefi
nitely held farmland) are a special case in which the tax rate has no
effect on present value.
The Effect of >&inicipal Bonds
Although the progressivity of the income tax per se does not
reduce high income persons' valuations of normally taxed, perpetual
income streams, the availability of tax-exempt interest from municipal
bonds does put an upper limit on the optimum level of taxable investment
income, and does thereby deter some high tax bracket individuals from
acquiring taxable income streams.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal Investment strategy for high
income individuals, is the Individual's wage and salary income
minus exemptions and deductions; is equal to Y^^ minus taxes on
level of taxable income above which municipals provide
the greatest after-tax return; and Y^ =Y^ - Y^ is the optimal level
of taxable Investment income. Maximum after-tax income from invested
equity is obtained by investing Y^/r® dollars in assets paying a
taxable return of r , and investing the remainder of equity in
municipals paying rate r". Line 1 shows gross-of-tax income from
this strategy and line 2 shows net-of-tax income. The initial segments
of line 2 have slopes equal to r°(l-t) and the kinks correspond to
movements between tax brackets. Line 3 shows the inferior net-of-
tax return which would result from a portfolio comprised entirely of











income to acquire before moving Into municipals Is determined by
the Individual's taxable wage and salary income; is determined by
the structure of interest rates and tax rates.
Municipal bond holders' valuation of the taxable income stream ^
depends on the value of tt relative to the Investors optimum level of
taxable Investment income, If tt ^ then the appropriate net-
of-tax discount rate for valuing the net-of-tax returns Tr(l-t) is
r^(l«t), despite the fact that the investor holds some municipals.
Since the optinium portfolio contains Y2 ^ tt of taxable investment
income, the asset producing tt will be substituted for previously held
assets producing taxable income at the rate r°. Therefore, municipal
bond holders whose optimum taxable investment Income level is as
large as n will value tt as highly as do lower tax bracket Individuals.
However, those investors for whom tt > Y^ will attach a lower
present value to tt than will lower bracket individuals. Consider
first those individuals for whom = 0 because their wage and salary
income alone puts them In the tax bracket where the highest after-tax
return on invested equity is obtained from municipal bonds, paying
rate r . This rate is the after-tax opportunity cost of capital for
them and is the appropriate discount rate for valuing after-tax returns
Since in this tax bracket r > r (1-t), using r^ as the discount rate
will cause their valuation of tt to be less than that of lower tax
bracket Individuals. To match their valuations, the after-tax oppor
tunity cost of capital would have to be the lower rate r°(l-t).
If the municipal bond holder's optimal level of taxable Investment
income is positive but less than tt, his valuation of tt will lie between
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the two cases just considered. The excess of Tr(l-t) over Y2(l-t) will
be discounted at rate r^ and these investors' valuations will also
fall below those of persons in lower tax brackets.
The conclusion is that municipal bond holders' valuations of
taxable income streams will be less than other individuals' valuations
if acquisition of the taxable income stream would raise their taxable
investment income above the optimum. Whether this is the case depends
largely on the municipal bond holder's level of taxable wage and
salary income. If this is'high, then optimal taxable investment
income is low, and large taxable income streams will be valued less
by them than by others.
The existence of an upper bound on the optimum level of taxable
income an investor will want to receive (before investing in municipals)
has been previously recognized by Dean and Carter. In their analysis
of the effect of income taxes upon the optimum size of unincorporated
firms operating in an industry where economies of scale exist, they
recognized that, because of progressive tax-rates and the availability
of tax-exempt interest, individuals find that beyond a limit the
after-tax return from expanded farm size is less than the municipal
rate.
However, Dean and Carter (p. 762, and note 12) also argued that
this limit may be circumvented by the use of debt. In their scenario,
a high bracket individual limits his equity investment in the farm
operation and expands with debt while investing his residual equity
in municipals. The tax deductions from debt interest keep down the
level of taxable income from the enterprise, while scale expands with
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invested debt capital. Carman implicitly accepted the validity of
Dean and Carter's analysis when he examined the effects of the tax
reform act of 1969 on optimum farm size. However, Dean and Carter's
analysis ignores a provision of the income tax law which prohibits
the scenario they describe.
Section 265(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 stipulates
that, "No deduction shall be allowed for interest on indebtedness
incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations. . . the interest
on which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle."^
The Revenue Procedures (72-18 and 74-8) issued by the IRS to set guide
lines concerning 265(2) and the court cases interpreting this
provision indicate that it does not automatically disallow all interest
deductions by municipal bond holders; among other allowances, the courts
have permitted interest deductions on loans taken for nonrecurrent
business needs. In the case of Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United
States the courts permitted the deduction of interest on a loan, the
proceeds of which were used to pay for the construction of a new plant,
although Cheeseman held municipals. Similarly, in the case of Ball v.
Commissioner, Ball, who held tax-exempt bonds throughout the relevant
years, was permitted interest deductions on a variety of loans
including two which were used to acquire ranches.
However, the courts have also ruled that interest deductions on
such loans, become dlsaUowed if the loans are continued beyond some
reasonable retirement period. In the case of Illinois Terminal
Railroad Co. v. United States the court disallowed the deduction of
interest on a loan originally incurred in connection with the acquisition
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of a bridge because the court's opinion was that the railroad's dominant
purpose in continuing the loan was to maintain its holdings of tax-exempt
bonds. I infer from these and related cases that the municipal bond
holder who uses debt in purchasing land is permitted to deduct the
interest only if the debt is retired within some "reasonable" interval.^
Therefore, investors cannot indefinitely use debt to circumvent the
upper bound on optimum taxable income identified in figure 1.
Consequently, some municipal bond holders will find taxable income
streams unattractive because of this limit.
Summary and Conclusions
One of the principal conclusions of this analysis is that the progres-
sivity of the income tax per se does not affect different investors'
valuations of normally taxed perpetual income streams. Since farmland
does not qualify for special tax factors unless it is resold, investors
planning indefinite holding of land are not differentially affected by
progressive income tax considerations. However, the availability of
tax-exempt municipal interest limits the optimum level of taxable invest
ment income and section 265(2) of the IRS code prohibits circumventing
this limit with the use of debt. Therefore, municipal bond holders are
deterred from acquiring taxable income streams if the acquisition would
move them above the optimum level of taxable income. A previous study
by Dean and Carter ignored section 265(2) and consequently overestimated
optimum farm size.
Although my results, like those of Harris and Nehring, imply that
high income investors may value farmland less highly than lower income
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individuals, the source and extent of the valuation disadvantage differ.
Harris and Nehring's attribution of the valuation disadvantage to the
progressivity of the income tax inqjlies that the effect operates
throughout all levels of taxable income. My conclusion is that the
progressivity of the income tax deters only some high income municipal
bond holders from acquiring farmland. Further, this effect is attri
butable to the existence of municipal interest, rather than to the
progressive income tax itself.
Although most investors may safely ignore income tax rates in the
significant special case of farmland valuation, this analysis indicates
that asset valuation should generally be conducted in net-of-tax terms.
To correctly value non-perpetual income streams and assets qualifying for
special tax consideration, it is necessary to adjust both the income




A I am grateful to Duane G. Harris for his helpful comments during
several stages of the preparation of this paper and to Neil E. Harl
for directing me to the appropriate legal references and assisting
in the citation of those references. Two anonymous reviewers'
connnents on a previous draft were also quite helpful. The author
accepts the usual responsibility for any remaining errors.
1. The concept of risk-equivalent classes of assets is discussed by
Modigliani and Miller in their 1958 and 1963 papers. Income streams
in a risk class differ only by a factor of porportionality.
2. If property taxes are expected to grow over time, this expectation
should be incorporated.
3. This approach is consistent with Modigliani and Miller's findings.
Their 1958 paper (pp. 268-9) showed that, in the absence of corporate
income taxes, the cost of capital to a firm is independent of its
debt-equity mix and equal to the rate of return to unlevered equity
invested in its risk class. Their 1963 paper shows that the corporate
income tax does create an advantage to corporate debt finance and
that the correct discount rate for corporate investment decisions
does depend on leverage. However, the tax effect is the only perma
nent advantage to corporate debt and this advantage does not apply
to individual unincorporated investors. It can be shown that the
debt-equity mix of individual investors strongly affects the expected
value and variance of returns to invested equity. However, the debt-
equity mix is irrelevant to present values because the effects of
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leverage apply to all investments and should not be attributed to
any particular investment. If a considered asset is to provide as
large a return to levered equity as do other assets in its risk
class, it must provide r° dollars of gross-of-tax returns to each
(equity and debt) dollar invested.
4. The net-of-expression is less simple if part of the return is growth.
Since allowing for income growth over time complicates the exposition
of this section without charging the results, I assume henceforth
that the income stream considered is not expected to grow over time.
5. The omission of the special treatment of capital gains in this
formula is justified by the' assumption that the investor expects
to retain the asset (in his family) indefinitely,
6, If this prohibition did not exist, individuals in high tax
brackets could earn arbitrage profits by borrowing money,
deducting the interest from taxable income, and investing the
loan proceeds in tax-exempt municipal bonds,
7, Neither the IRS nor the courts have specified how quickly debt
must be retired to avoid invoking 265(2), but the Illinois
Terminal Railroad Col case demonstrates that indefinite con
tinuance of debt is not permitted.
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